Indian National Army of Liberation
in the EastOn 15
February 1942, Singapore fell to the Japanese army advancing southward
from the Malayan peninsula. Two days later, in an impressive ceremony held
at Farrar Park in the heart of the town, [British] Indian troops were
handed over to the Japanese as prisoners-of-war by their commanding
officer, Colonel Hunt.
Major Fujiwara took them over on
behalf of the victorious Japanese, and then announced that he was handing
them over to Captain Mohan Singh of the Indian contingents, who should be
obeyed by them as their Supreme Commander. Mohan Singh then spoke to the
Indian POWs, expressing his intention of raising an Indian national army
out of them to fight for India's freedom. He held a preliminary discussion
with some prominent Indians in Malay and Burma in a meeting in Singapore
on 9 and 10 March, which was attended by Rashbehari Bose, a veteran Indian
revolutionary exile living in Japan for the last quarter of a century.
Bose then called a conference in Tokyo, which was held 28-30 March. The
delegates representing several East and Southeast Asian countries present
at the conference decided to form the Indian Independence League to
organize an Indian independence movement in East Asia. Bose was recognized
as head of the organization. The conference further resolved that
"military action against the British in India will be taken only by the
INA and under Indian command, together with such military, naval and air
cooperation and assistance as may be requested from the Japanese by the
Council of Action" and further, "after the liberation of India, the
framing of the future constitution of India will be left entirely to the
representatives of the people of India."20
 On 15 June 1942, a
conference opened in Bangkok with over a hundred delegates of the IIL
[Indian Independence League] attending from all over Asia. By the close of
the nine-day conference a resolution was unanimously adopted setting forth
the policies of the independence movement in East Asia. The IIL was
proclaimed the organization to work for India's freedom; the Indian
National Army was declared the military arm of the movement with Mohan
Singh as the Commander-in-chief and Rashbehari Bose was elected president
of the Council of Action. It was further decided that Singapore would be
the headquarters of the IIL. Netaji had stated in a message to the
conference that his personal experience had convinced him that Japan,
Italy and Germany were sworn enemies of British imperialism; yet,
independence could come only through the efforts of Indians themselves.
India's freedom would mean the rout of British imperialism. The Indian
National Army was officially inaugurated in September 1942. [Image: "The
Dream of Netaji" (1944), INA recruiting poster.]
Unfortunately, at this point
distrust began to grow within the Indian group against Rashbehari Bose's
leadership. Some thought that having been long associated with Japan, he
gave precedence to the Japanese interests over Indian interests. According
to Japanese records:
Some even thought that he
was just the protégé of the Japanese, and that the latter were
exploiting Indians for their own ends. Such resentment finally resulted
in a revolt of a group of leaders headed by Captain Mohan Singh within
the INA in November 1942. As a consequence, Mohan Singh and his
associate, Colonel Gill, were both arrested by the Japanese and the
Indian Army was disbanded. However, in 1943 a new Indian Army was
organized, put under the command of Lt. Col. Bhonsle, who held this post
until the final dissolution of the
army.21 Describing the revived INA, Joyce Lebra
writes:
On 15 February 1943, the
INA was reorganized and former ranks and badges revived. The Director of
the Military Bureau, Lieutenant-Colonel Bhonsle, was clearly placed
under the authority of the IIL to avoid any repetition of IIL-ANA
rivalry. Under Bhonsle was Lt. Col. Shah Nawaz Khan as Chief of General
Staff, Major P.K. Sahgal as Military Secretary; Major Habibur Rahman as
commandant of the Officers' Training School; and Lt. Col. A.C.
Chatterji, and later Major A.D. Jahangir, as head of enlightenment and
culture. Apart from this policy-forming body was the Army itself, under
the command of Lt. Col. M.Z. Kiani. This was the organization which held
the INA together until the arrival of Subhas Chandra Bose from Berlin,
six months later. In
February, the Japanese military officer Iwakuro had called a meeting of
about three hundred officers of the INA at Bidadri camp in Singapore and
spoke to them about the advisability of joining the army, but with no
effect. According to Ghosh, "Later on, in a 'heart-to-heart talk' with
some officers, it emerged that a large number of officers and men would be
willing to continue in the INA on the express condition that Netaji would
be coming to Singapore."23
The story of Netaji's exploits in
Germany and the history of the Indian Legion was known to Indian
revolutionaries of the IIL in East Asia for some time now, and they
awaited his arrival eagerly. As the first INA wavered, faltered and was
finally disbanded, and as its successor merely continued to exist, the
need for Netaji's leadership began to be felt more keenly. Mohan Singh had
mentioned his name to General Fujiwara as early as 1941. In all
conferences the need of his guidance had been emphasized by the
delegates.
While Netaji and Abid Hasan
continued to push toward the East making a wide sweep out into the
Atlantic, by pre-arrangement, a Japanese submarine left Penang Island on
20 April for the tip of Africa, under strict orders not to attack or risk
detection. The two submarines had a rendevous four hundred miles
south-southwest of Madagascar on 26 April. After sighting each other and
confirming their identity, the submarines waited for a day for the sea to
become calm. Then on 28 April, in what was known to be the only known
submarine-to-submarine transfer of passengers (in the annals of World War
II) in an area dominated by the enemy's air and naval strength, Netaji and
Abid Hasan were transhipped into the Japanese submarine via a rubber
raft.
Travelling across the ocean, the
Japanese 1-29 reached Sabang on 6 May, 1943. It was an isolated offshore
islet north of Sumatra. There, Netaji was welcomed by Colonel Yamamoto,
who was the head of the Hikari Kikan, the Japanese-Indian liaison group.
From Sabang, Netaji and Yamamoto left for Tokyo by plane, stopping en
route at Penang, Manila, Saigon and Taiwan. The plane landed in Tokyo on
16 May. All throughout his submarine voyage from Germany and for about a
month after his arrival in Tokyo, Netaji's identity and presence was kept
a secret. He was supposed to be a Japanese VIP named Matsuda.
Although he remained incognito
during the first few weeks in Japan, Netaji did not waste any time by just
waiting. From 17 May onwards, he met Japanese Army and Navy
Chiefs-of-Staff, Navy Minister and Foreign Minister in rapid succession.
However, he had to wait for nearly three weeks before Japanese Prime
Minister Tojo granted him an interview. But Tojo was so impressed with
Netaji's personality that he offered to meet him again after four days.
Two days later, on 16 June, Netaji was invited to visit the Diet where
Tojo surprised him with his historic declaration on India:
We are indignant about
the fact that India is still under the ruthless suppression of Britain
and are in full sympathy with her desperate struggle for independence.
We are determined to extend every possible assistance to the cause of
India's independence. It is our belief that the day is not far off when
India will enjoy freedom and prosperity after winning
independence.24 It was not until 18 June that Tokyo Radio
announced Netaji's arrival. The news was reported in the Tokyo press the
following day. At this announcement, the atmosphere was electrified
overnight. The Axis press and radio stressed the significance of the
event. The INA and the Indian independence movement suddenly assumed far
greater importance in the eyes of all. On 19 June, Netaji held a press
conference. This was followed by two broadcasts to publicize further his
presence in East Asia, and during the course of these he unfolded his plan
of action. Bose's plan stood for the co-ordination of the nationalist
forces within India and abroad to make it a gigantic movement powerful
enough to overthrow the British rulers of India. The assumption on which
Bose seemed to have based his grand scheme was that the internal
conditions in India were ripe for a revolt. The no-cooperation movement
must turn into an active revolt.25
And to quote Netaji's own words
during the press conference: "Civil disobedience must develop into armed
struggle. And only when the Indian people have received the baptism of
fire on a large scale would they be qualified to achieve
freedom."26 Netaji then embarked upon a series of meetings,
press conferences, radio broadcasts and lectures in order to explain his
immediate task to the people concerned, and the world.
 Accompanied by Rashbehari Bose, Netaji
arrived at Singapore from Tokyo on 27 June. He was given a tumultuous
welcome by the resident Indians and was profusely 'garlanded' wherever he
went. His speeches kept the listeners spellbound. By now, a legend had
grown around him, and its magic infected his audiences. Addressing
representatives of the Indian communities in East Asia on 4 July he said:
"Not content with a civil disobedience campaign, Indian people are now
morally prepared to employ other means for achieving their liberation. The
time has therefore come to pass on to the next stage of our campaign. All
organizations, whether inside India or outside, must now transform
themselves into a disciplined fighting organization under one leadership.
The aim and purpose of this organization should be to take up arms against
British imperialism when the time is ripe and signal is
given.27 [Image: Bose welcomed in the Philippines.]
At a public meeting where Netaji
spoke these words, Rashbehari Bose formally handed over to Subhas Chandra
Bose the leadership of the IIL and command of the INA. The hall was packed
to capacity. In his last speech as leader of the movement Rashbehari Bose
said:
Friends! This is one of
the happiest moments in my life. I have brought you one of the most
outstanding personalities of our great Motherland to participate in our
campaign. In your presence today, I resign my office as president of the
Indian Independence League in East Asia. From now on, Subhas Chandra
Bose is your president, your leader in the fight for India's
independence, and I am confident that under his leadership, you will
march on to battle and to victory.28 In that meeting Netaji announced his plan to
organize a Provisional Government of Free India.
It will be the task of
this provisional government to lead the Indian Revolution to its
successful conclusion ... The Provisional Government will have to
prepare the Indian people, inside and outside India, for an armed
struggle which will be the culmination of all our national efforts since
1883. We have a grim fight ahead of us. In this final march to freedom,
you will have to face danger, thirst, privation, forced marches -- and
death. Only when you pass this test will freedom be
yours.29 The next day, on 5 July, Netaji took over the
command of the Indian National Army, now christened Azad Hind Fauj (Free
India Army). Tojo arrived from Manila in time to review the parade of
troops standing alongside with Bose. Addressing the soldiers, Netaji
said:
Throughout my pubic
career, I have always felt that, though India is otherwise ripe for
independence in every way, she has lacked one thing, namely, an army of
liberation. George Washington of America could fight and win freedom,
because he had his army. Garibaldi could liberate Italy because he had
his armed volunteers behind him. It is your privilege and honor to be
the first to come forward and organize India's national army. By doing
so you have removed the last obstacle in our path to freedom ... When
France declared war on Germany in 1939 and the campaign began, there was
but one cry which rose from the lips of German soldiers -- "To Paris! To
Paris!" When the brave soldiers of Nippon set out on their march in
December 1941, there was but one cry which rose from their lips -- "To
Singapore! To Singapore!" Comrades! My soldiers! Let your battle-cry be
-- "To Delhi! To Delhi!" How many of us will individually survive this
war of freedom, I do not know. But I do know this, that we shall
ultimately win and our task will not end until our surviving heroes hold
the victory parade on another graveyard of the British Empire -- Lal
Kila or the Red Fortress of ancient
Delhi.30 On 27 July, Netaji left Singapore for a
17-day tour of the East Asian and Southeast Asian countries. The prime
objective of this tour was to enlist moral and monetary support for his
movement from other countries, as well as the resident Indian communities.
He was given a rousing reception in Rangoon, where he attended the Burmese
independence on 1 August; from Rangoon Netaji went to Bangkok and met Thai
Prime Minister Pilbulsongram. He won the moral support of Thailand and
tumultuous ovation from the Indian community. He then flew to Saigon and
addressed Indians there. Returning to Singapore for a brief rest, he flew
to Penang to address a rally of 15,000 Indians. Everywhere, he held his
audience spellbound for hours with his superb oratory, and at the
conclusion of his speech the people raced to reach the platform and pile
up all they had before him -- a total of two million dollars. This scene
was repeated over and over in towns and cities all over Southeast Asia,
when Netaji stood before thousands of people like a prophet, addressing
them for the cause of India's freedom. Merchants, traders, businessmen and
women came forward everywhere and donated their wealth and ornaments in
abundance, to enable their leader to fulfill his mission.
In his plan for total mobilization,
Netaji had outlined a grandiose scheme for an army of three million men.
However, the immediate target was set at 50,000. The major part of this
number would be from the Indian POWs and the rest from civilian
volunteers. According to Bose's plan there would be three divisions from
thirty thousand regulars and another unit of twenty thousand mainly from
civilian volunteers. The Japanese authorities informed Netaji at that time
that it could provide arms for thirty thousand men only. However, by 1945
it was authoritatively known that the actual strength of the INA rose to
not less than 45,000 men. After completing the task of reorganizing the
Indian Independence League and launching preparations for revolutionizing
the army, and after conducting a successful campaign to mobilize the
support of the Indian communities throughout Southeast Asia -- a phase
which lasted from July to October -- Netaji turned toward formation of the
Provisional Government of Azad Hind (Free India). This had to be done
before the army could be sent for action in the battlefield. This
government was officially proclaimed in Singapore at a mass rally on 21
October 1943 where Netaji was unanimously elected as the Head of the State
and the Supreme Commander of the Indian National Army. While taking the
oath he said:
In the name of God, I
take this sacred oath that to liberate India and the three hundred
eighty million of my countrymen. I, Subhas Chandra Bose, will continue
the sacred war of freedom till the last breath of my life. I shall
remain always a servant of India, and to look after the welfare of three
hundred eighty million of Indian brothers and sisters shall be for me my
highest duty. Even after winning freedom, I will always be prepared to
shed even the last drop of my blood for the preservation of India's
freedom.31 The Provisional Government of Free India had
five Ministers with Netaji as the Head of the State, Prime Minister and
Minister for War and advisers representing the Indian communities in East
Asia. The first momentous decision which the new government took was its
declaration of war on Britain and the United States, which was decided on
the night of 22-23 October. Toye writes: "The Cabinet had not been
unanimous about the inclusion of the U.S.A. Bose had shown impatience and
displeasure -- there was never any question then or later of his absolute
authority: the Cabinet had no responsibility and could only tender
advice."32 Recognition of the Provisional Government came
quickly from nine countries -- the Axis powers and their allies. They
were: Japan, Burma, Croatia, Germany, the Philippines, Nanking China,
Manchuto, Italy and Siam (Thailand), but for some unknown reasons, Vichy
France withheld its recognition. The Japanese Army promised all-out
support for the provisional government.
Toward the end of October, Netaji
flew to Tokyo again to meet Tojo and to attend the greater East Asia
Conference. Since India technically did not fall within this sphere, he
attended as an observer. He made an impressive speech at the conference,
stressing the creation of a new Asia where all vestiges of colonialism and
imperialism would be eliminated. The Japanese navy had captured the
Andaman and Nicober islands in the Bay of Bengal during the early months
of war. As a result of Netaji's requests, Prime Minister Tojo announced at
the conference that Japan had decided to place the two islands under the
jurisdiction of the Provisional Government of Free India, thereby giving
it its first sovereignty over a territory.
The ceremonial transfer took place
in December, and Netaji named Lieutenant-Colonel Loganathan, an officer in
the Medical Services, as the chief commissioner in charge of the civil
administration of the islands. Soon thereafter preparations began for
sending the army to the front and moving the provisional government
headquarters to Rangoon, in Burma. In the meantime, Netaji announced the
formation of a women's brigade within the INA and named it "Rani of Jhansi
Regiment," after the celebrated queen of Jhansi, Laxmibai, who had led her
soldiers against the British in an uprising during the First War of
Independence in 1857. Coincidentially, another Laxmi, Lieutenant-Col.
Laxmi, was placed in charge of this regiment by Netaji. In November it was
agreed between Netaji and the Japanese militay headquarters that the INA
first division and the civil and military headquarters would move to Burma
in January 1944.
The Imphal
CampaignThe Imphal
Campaign, including the battle of Kohima -- the first major town to be
captured by the INA inside India -- will perhaps go down as one of the
most daring and disastrous campaigns in the annals of world military
history. General Mutaguchi, commander of the Japanese forces in North
Burma since 1943, had been convinced that Imphal should be attacked. The
objects of such an offensive were to forestall any invasion of Burma in
1944 and to establish the Japanese defenses on the frontier mountains. The
idea would be first to overwhelm the British in Arakan, involving all
their reserves in battle for Chittagong and the gateway to eastern Bengal.
Then, by April, Kohima and Imphal could be conquered at leisure, without
danger of their being reinforced. The monsoon, beginning in May, would
postpone operations, and after the rains were over, in the absence of a
new British defense posture east of the river Brahmaputra, the entire
Assam and East Bengal would lie open to the Indian National Army and the
Japanese.
Imphal, the capital of the state of
Manipur, lay on a flat, nearly treeless plateau just inside the Indian
border. Its elevation was about 3,000 feet, surrounded on all sides by
impassable mountains. The mountain range in the east with 2,000-4,000 foot
peaks above the plateau stretches some five hundred miles. To the West and
South are the Chin hills of the Arakan range, a formidable stretch of
inhospitable terrain. The jungle surrounding this basin is hostile to
human habitation. The northern access to the plain from India and Assam
lay through Dimapur and the steep Kohima Road. From Dimapur, a single
track railway swept through Assam and Bengal and was an important military
objective to both armies. For the INA the importance of the Imphal
campaign was that it was the only major battle in which it would
participate with the object of achieving freedom for India. As Salto and
Hayashida write:
The Imphal Operation was
the final offensive of the East Asia War, mounted by three Burma-based
Japanese divisions, and one INA division. The campaign lasted from 15
March to 9 July 1944. The operation has often been compared to the
operation Wacht am Rhein or the Battle of the Bulge, which was the final
all-out drive launched by Germany towards Ardennes on the Western Front,
from December 1944 to January 1945. Both operations almost succeeded and
both are termed "gambles" by historians today. If the German push
towards Ardennes was Wacht am Rhein, the Japanese-Indian thrust against
Imphal might be called "Wacht am Chindwin" although the official
Japanese code-name for the action was most prosaic: Operation
"U".33 River Chindwin lay across the Indo-Burmese
border, and its crossing from the east by an army would signal an invasion
of India.
Execution orders for Operation U
became operative on 7 January 1944, coinciding with completion of the
shifting of the Provisional Government headquarters in Rangoon. In the
evening of the same day, Lt. General Masakazy Kawabe, commanding the
overall Burma headquarters, held a welcome party in honor of Netaji and
his staff officers. Netaji spoke, and concluded his speech with these
words: "My only prayer to the Almighty at this moment is that we may be
given the earliest opportunity to pay for our freedom with our own
blood."34 One INA Division, named after Netaji as Subhas
Regiment, was readied for action at the front with the Japanese. Toye
writes.
... He spent the whole
days ... with the Subhas Regiment, reviewing, watching it at exercises
and on parade, talking to its officers, exerting his magic on it in a
way that he had not attempted before. These were his comrades, the men
by whose means he would uphold the rights and honour of India.
Everything depended on their achievement in battle; they must absorb all
his feelings of confidence, feel the whole of his personal force. On 3
February he bade them farewell: "Blood is calling for blood. Arise! We
have no time to lose. Take up your arms. There in front of you is the
road. our pioneers have built. We shall march along that road. We shall
carve our way through enemy's ranks, or, if God wills, we shall die a
martyr's death. And in our last sleep we shall kiss the road which will
bring our Army to Delhi. The road to Delhi is the road to Freedom. On to
Delhi!"35 Mutaguchi set 15 March as the D-day for the
beginning of the Imphal campaign. The deployment of well over 120,000
troops along the Chindwin river, a front of some 200 kilometers, went on
smoothly and undetected by British spies planted in the area. In the
meantime, Netaji received some good news. The Arakan offensive, launched
on 4 February, had cut off the 7th Indian Division of the British Army in
Mayu valley. Contributing to this success was the reconnaissance and
subversion of an Indian outpost position by Major Misra, the INA Commander
in Arakan. At the same time, he received messages from the underground
network working inside India under his direction, whose selected trained
spies had been sent by submarine. On D-day, Mutaguchi assembled the war
correspondents at his headquarters in central Burma and declared: "I am
firmly convinced that my three divisions will reduce Imphal in one month.
In order that they can march fast, they carry the lightest possible
equipment and food enough for three weeks. They will get everything from
the British supplies and dumps. Boys! See you again in Imphal at the
celebration of the Emperor's birthday on 29 April."36
The Japanese-Indian offensive took
the British by complete surprise. The Japanese and INA troops literally
galloped through mountains and jungles routing the enemy on the way. Prior
to the Imphal offensive, an INA detachment under Colonel Saligal had
created a breach through the British lines in the Arakan sector. Now the
INA's deployment was extended to the Imphal sector. As the INA under
Netaji's command set foot on the Indian soil, the main Japanese force also
defeated the obstinate resistance of the enemy on 22 March, broke through
the India-Burma border, and advanced from the north and west to encircle
Imphal. The initial success of the INA at the Arakan front generated much
enthusiasm. In a Special Order of the Day, Netaji referred to the
"Glorious and brilliant actions of the brave forces of the Azad Hind
Fauj."37
On 8 April, Japanese Imperial
Headquarters issued a communique which said: "Japanese troops, fighting
side by side with the Indian National Army, captured Kohima early on 6
April."38 A jubilant Netaji at this time started talking with
the Japanese about the administration of the liberated and
soon-to-be-liberated territories in India. In response to a call by
Netaji, Prime Minister Tojo made an announcement clarifying that all areas
of India occupied as a result of Japanese advance would be placed under
the jurisdiction of the Provisional Government. This was followed by
Netaji's announcement that he was appointing the Finance Minister of his
cabinet, Major-General A.C. Chatterjee, as the governor of the newly
liberated areas. Netaji described the march of the INA into India as the
event of the century. He had also just declared the Legion in Europe to be
part of the INA and had appointed Nambiar to be a Minister in the
Provisional Government; his Chief Commissioner had been installed in the
Andamans, his first heroes from the Arakan front had been decorated, and
the INA troops had raised the national standard of free India in Kohima;
and now, the fall of Imphal seemed very near.
Did the Imphal Campaign come almost
two years too late? What would have happened if Netaji had arrived in East
Asia a year earlier? By the, end of 1942, the Axis had scored successes
everywhere:
Rommel was in Egypt, the
German invasion of Russia had gone smoothly, Nationalist China was on
her knees, and India and Australia were expecting a Japanese invasion.
Prospects for the Allies were dark in the Pacific and the Rising Sun was
at its zenith from Japan to the Bay of Bengal ... Britain was unable to
dispute with the Japanese Navy, and there were not enough British and
Indian troops in India to assure its defense. Even air protection was
inadequte ... Japanese forces had not pursued retreating British troops
beyond the Chindwin river in Burma in May 1942, allegedly because "an
invasion was likely to arouse ill-feelings amongst the Indian masses."
... So the Japanese remained east of the Chindwin river, leaving British
Indian forces to build up their strength in the Imphal
plain.39 But above all, in that moment of a golden
opportunity, the towering leadership of Netaji, a provisional government,
and an Indian national army worthy of its name -- all these were
non-existent in East Asia. Japan by itself simply lacked the motivation
for extending war into India, let alone think of its independence. The
fact remains, however, that the Imphal campaign was indeed first conceived
in 1942, right after the conquest of Burma. According to the official
history of the British Armed Forces in the Second World War,
Soon after the completion
of the Japanese conquest of Burma in June 1942, a certain Lt. Col.
Hayashi had advocated an attack on Imphal. He considered that the
Japanese should strike against India without giving time to the
defenders to recuperate from their disastrous retreat, and Imphal's
capture would rob them of the best base for launching a
counter-offensive against Burma ... 18th division argued that the
jungles of Burma were impassable for large bodies of operational troops
and that any attack on Indian territory would provoke anti-Japanese
feelings in India. About December 1942, therefore, the plan was
abandoned.40 Lieutenant-General Kuroda Shigetoku, Southern
Army Chief of Staff, stated later that if the operation had been carried
out in 1942 when first conceived, rather than in 1944, it would have
succeeded. According to Lebra, "General Tojo stated in the spring of 1945
that he regretted Japan had missed the opportunity in
1942."41
As the INA and the Japanese forces
continued to lay siege on Imphal, the Allied air superiority gained
strength and the enemy was preparing for counterattack. Shah Nawaz,
commanding two battalions of the Subhas Regiment in the Chin Hills, told
of the hardships his men were suffering as a result of disease and of
supply and transport difficulties. However, owing to communication
problems, the news of difficulties his men were undergoing at the front
did not reach Netaji in detail. While there was a stalemate in the front
and the offensive came to a halt, there were meetings and jubilations at
Rangoon where Netaji collected money and donations in other forms for the
conduct of his campaign. He offered to send additional INA regiments to
the Front and more troops were despatched. For about a month Operation U
went according to plan. Enemy forces were successfully encircled in the
Imphal area.
Suddenly, in the middle of April,
the military balance began to shift against Japan and the INA. Wingate's
airborne unit had already been attacking from the air over the Burmese
supply routes. British forces were being supplied by airlift into the
besieged Imphal, and reinforcements began to flow in. British forces were
being sent to Kohima to the north by both rail and air. Japan had no
matching air power to strike back at enemy air operations. By the end of
April the battle strength of Japanese and INA divisions was decreased
forty percent. Time for success by surprise attack had already passed and
gradually the offensive turned into a defensive battle. The monsoon that
followed brought the ultimate disaster. As roads became impassable, all
supply routes were cut off. Muddy streams flooded roads and valleys, and
rivers swelled to sweep away tanks and ammunition. In the wake of the
monsoon, disease became rampant. Cholera, malaria, dysentery, beriberi and
jungle sores began to take their toll. The INA and the Japanese started
living on rations consisting of rice mixed with jungle grass. The 33rd
Division had fought desperately for forty days without being able to
penetrate the British lines at Imphal. And now that vast amounts of
military supplies were reaching the beleaguered garrison at Imphal, there
was virtually no hope for a renewed offensive. On 8 July, on the
recommendation of top-ranking Generals including Kawabe and Mutaguchi,
Prime Minister Tajo issued the order to halt the operation.
The story of the retreat from Imphal
is one of the greatest tragedies of World War II. It is a story of misery,
hunger and death. Japanese and INA troops, bottled up in the Kawab valley
between the Chin Hills in the west and the Chindwin river in the west,
began their long trek back through jungles and mountains, headed by
division commanders and guards in jeeps and horses. Officers, supply,
communication and medical units followed. Behind them marched thousands of
stragglers: rain-soaked, emaciated with fever and malnutrition. Soon,
corpses began accumulating along the trek, and they had to be left
unburied. Of the 220,000 Japanese troops who began the Imphal Campaign,
only 130,000 survived, and of these only 70,000 remained at the front to
retreat. INA casualties were over fifty percent. It was a disaster equal
in magnitude to Dunkirk and Stalingrad. Lebra writes:
When Bose heard the order
to retreat he was stunned. He drew himself up and said to Kawabe in
ringing tones: "Though the Japanese Army has given up the operation, we
will continue it. We will not repent even if the advance of our
revolutionary army to attain independence of our homeland is completely
defeated. Increase in casualties, cessation of supplies, and famine are
not reasons enough to stop marching. Even if the whole army becomes only
spirit we will not stop advancing toward our homeland. This is the
spirit of our revolutionary army." In an article in Azad Hind on
6 November 1944, after the retreat from Imphal, Bose was reported to
have "reiterated his firm conviction that final victory in this war
would belong to Japan and Germany ... that a new phase of war was
approaching in which the initiative would again lie in the hands of the
Japanese."42 Each Japanese commander gave his own analysis
of the causes of the failure of Operation U, like the problem of the chain
of command, lack of air power, or dispersal rather than concentration of
forces. However, Netaji thought it was timing, with respect to the
monsoon. He felt that the only chance to take Imphal was before the rains
came, and most strategists agreed on this point. From the historic
perspective, however, Fujiwara perhaps was the most correct. According to
him, the Imphal disaster could have been avoided had the operation been
undertaken a year earlier, at a time when the British power in the region
was weak. The delay in launching the Imphal offensive was no doubt due to
Netaji's late arrival from Europe to East Asia. The Imphal campaign should
have been undertaken at a time when the Axis victories had reached their
zenith and the Allied forces were on retreat everywhere.
During the last three months of
1944, Japanese forces had withdrawn to the banks of the Irrawaddy in
Burma, where they intended to make a stand. Netaji enthusiastically
offered the reorganized INA First Division, when the Japanese 15th
division was ordered to oppose the British. Subsquently, the 2nd Division
was also readied for action. In February 1945, the INA held some positions
in the region of Mandalay in Burma, giving battle to the advancing enemy.
This was the second campaign of Netaji's army, and it held out tenaciously
at Nyaungu for some time. However, Allied troops later crossed the
Irrawaddy at several points and the Japanese and INA units were
surrounded. There were some desertions. Despite unique examples of heroism
and Netaji's presence in the battlefields, risking his own life in the
face of enemy attacks, the second campaign of the INA (which was purely a
defensive one) finally had to give way to the gradual reconquest of Burma
by the British.
The end of this campaign was
followed by a chain of events that included the final Japanese defeat, an
alleged plane crash in Formosa in which Netaji reportedly perished, the
surrender of the INA to the Allied forces and the trial of their leaders
at the Red Fort in Delhi, staged by the British. However, all these
fateful events, occuring during the final phase of World War II and its
aftermath, should be considered parts of an altogether different episode
relating to Subhas Chandra Bose and the Indian National Army. In the
present episode we have examined the historical tasks fulfilled by Netaji
and his army in Europe and Asia during World War II, and their
significance. In recognition of Netaji's historically significant role as
a war leader, Guy Wint pays him a rare tribute with these words: "He
played ... an extraordinarily decisive part. By accident, and by seizing
an exceptional opportunity, he was able to cut a figure which made him
outstanding among the comparatively small number of men who influenced the
course of the war by their individual qualities."43
The Myth of "Freedom through
Non-violence under Gandhi's Leadership"Modern historians in India are taking a
second look at the way the country's freedom was achieved, and in that
process are demolishing a number of theories, assumptions and myths
preached by the "court historians." However, in order to grasp the
magnitude of the issue, with its many ramifications, it is essential to
understand first the concept of freedom as envisaged by Netaji -- the
ideal which motivated him to wrest it from the hands of the British by the
force of arms. In his entire political career, Subhas Chandra Bose was
guided by two cardinal principles in his quest for his country's
emancipation: that there could be no compromise with alien colonialists on
the issue, and that on no account would the country be partitioned. The
Indian geographical unity was to be maintained at all costs.
 As we have already seen, the unfortunate turn
of events during World War II prevented Netaji's dream of his victorious
march to Delhi at the head of his Indian National Army from becoming a
reality. In his and his army's absence in a post-war India, politicians
under the leadership of Gandhi and Nehru did exactly what Netaji never
wanted: they negotiated and compromised with the British on the issue of
freedom, and in their haste to get into power, agreed to a formula of
partitioning India presented to them by the British. [Image: Gandhi and
Bose before the War.]
The transfer of power was followed
by two more developments that were alien to Netaji's philosophy and his
blueprint for a free India: introduction of a parliamentary democratic
system by Nehru and his decision to keep India in the British Commonwealth
of Nations. It was a truncated freedom, achieved over the bloodbath of
millions who had perished in fratricidal religious rioting during the
process of partition, as the erstwhile India emerged on the world map as
the two nations of India and Pakistan. Even so, the fragmented freedom
that fell as India's share after the British had skillfully played their
age-old game of divide and rule came not as a result of Gandhi's civil
disobedience and non-violent movement as the court historians would have
us believe; nor was it due to persistent negotiations by Nehru and other
Indian National Congress leaders on the conference table, which the
British found so easy to keep stalling. The British finally quit when they
began to feel the foundations of loyalty being shaken among the British
Indian soldiers -- the mainstay of the colonial power -- as a result of
the INA exploits that became known to the world after the cessation of
hostilities in East Asia.
Ramesh Chandra Majumdar, the eminent
Indian historian who passed away recently, and who by virtue of his
challenges to several historical myths can rightly be called the Dean of
new historians in India, observed in his book Three Phases of India's
Struggle for Freedom:
There is, however, no
basis for the claim that the Civil Disobedience Movement directly led to
independence. The campaigns of Gandhi ... came to an ignoble end about
fourteen years before India achieved independence ... During the First
World War the Indian revolutionaries sought to take advantage of German
help in the shape of war materials to free the country by armed revolt.
But the attempt did not succeed. During the Second World War Subhas Bose
followed the same method and created the INA. In spite of brilliant
planning and initial success, the violent campaigns of Subhas Bose
failed ... The Battles for India's freedom were also being fought
against Britain, though indirectly, by Hitler in Europe and Japan in
Asia. None of these scored direct success, but few would deny that it
was the cumulative effect of all the three that brought freedom to
India. In particular, the revelations made by the INA trial, and the
reaction it produced in India, made it quite plain to the British,
already exhausted by the war, that they could no longer depend upon the
loyalty of the sepoys for maintaining their authority in India. This had
probably the greatest influence upon their final decision to quit
India.44 Despite Japan's defeat and the consequent
withering away of the Indian National Army on the India-Burma front, both
Subhas Chandra Bose and his INA became household names throughout the
country as the returning soldiers were sought to be prosecuted by the
British. By then, the Congress leadership under Gandhi and Nehru had
pre-empted itself, and the year 1945 seemed relatively calm and
uneventful. However, Netaji and his legend worked up a movement all over
the country which even a Gandhi could never produce. Echoing this mass
upsurge Michael Edwardes wrote in his Last Years of British
India:
The Government of India
had hoped, by prosecuting members of the INA, to reinforce the morale of
the Indian army. It succeeded only in creating unease, in making the
soldiers feel slightly ashamed that they themselves had supported the
British. If Bose and his men had been on the right side -- and all India
now confirmed that they were -- then Indians in the Indian army must
have been on the wrong side. It slowly dawned upon the Government of
India that the backbone of the British rule, the Indian army, might now
no longer be trustworthy. The ghost of Subhas Bose, like Hamlet's
father, walked the battlements of the Red Fort (where the INA soldiers
were being tried), and his suddenly amplified figure overawed the
conference that was to lead to
independence.45 Apart from revisionist historians, it was
none other than Lord Clement Atlee himself, the British Prime Minister
responsible for conceding independence to India, who gave a shattering
blow to the myth sought to be perpetuated by court historians, that Gandhi
and his movement had led the country to freedom. Chief Justice P.B.
Chakrabarty of Calcutta High Court, who had also served as the acting
Governor of West Bengal in India, disclosed the following in a letter
addressed to the publisher of Dr. R.C. Majumdar's book A History of
Bengal. The Chief Justice wrote:
You have fulfilled a
noble task by persuading Dr. Majumdar to write this history of Bengal
and publishing it ... In the preface of the book Dr. Majumdar has
written that he could not accept the thesis that Indian independence was
brought about solely, or predominantly, by the non-violent civil
disobedience movement of Gandhi. When I was the acting Governor, Lord
Atlee, who had given us independence by withdrawing the British rule
from India, spent two days in the Governor's palace at Calcutta during
his tour of India. At that time I had a prolonged discussion with him
regarding the real factors that had led the British to quit India. My
direct question to him was that since Gandhi's "Quit India" movement had
tapered off quite some time ago and in 1947 no such new compelling
situation had arisen that would necessitate a hasty British departure,
why did they have to leave? In his reply Atlee cited several reasons,
the principal among them being the erosion of loyalty to the British
Crown among the Indian army and navy personnel as a result of the
military activities of Netaji. Toward the end of our discussion I asked
Atlee what was the extent of Gandhi's influence upon the British
decision to quit India. Hearing this question, Atlee's lips became
twisted in a sarcastic smile as he slowly chewed out the word,
"m-i-n-i-m-a-l!"46 When the new version of the history of the
Twentieth Century India, and especially the episode of the country's
unique struggle for independence comes to be written, it will no doubt
single out but one person who made the most significant and outstanding
contribution among all his compatriots toward the emancipation of his
motherland from the shackles of an alien bondage. During World War II this
man strode across two continents like a colossus, and the footsteps of his
army of liberation reverberated through the forests and plains of Europe
and the jungles and mountians of Asia. His armed assaults shook the very
foundations of the British Empire. His name was Subhas Chandra
Bose.
NOTES
1. Bose, Subhas Chandra, The
Indian Struggle 1920-1942, New York: Asia Publishing House, 1964, p.
318.
2. Ibid., pp. 419-422,
431-432.
3. Ganpuley, N.G., Netaji in
Germany: A Little-known Chapter, Bombay, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1959,
p. 63.
4. Ibid., pp. 63-64.
5. Toye, Hugh, The Springing
Tiger, London, Cassell, 1959, p. 63.
6. Ibid., p. 70.
7. Lebra, Joyce C., Jungle
Alliance: Japan and the Indian National Army. Singapore, Asia Pacific
Library, p. 110.
8. The Goebbels Diaries,
1942-1943, Edited, translated and with an introd. by Louis P. Lochner,
Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1970, p. 107.
9. Ibid., P. 123.
10. Ibid., p. 211.
11. Toye, Hugh, op. cit., pp.
72-73.
12. Ibid., p. 75.
13. Seifriz, Adalbert, In Preface to
Ganpuley's Netaji in Germany.
14. Sopan, pseud., Ed., Netaji
Subhas Chandra Bose. His Life and Work. Bombay, Azad Bhandar, 1946,
pp. 281-282, 284.
15. Ganpuley, N.G., op. cit., p.
153.
16. Staatsmaenner und Diplomaten
bei Hitler, Part Two, Edited by Andreas Hillgrueber, Frankfurt am
Main, Bernard & Graefe fuer Wehrwesen, 1970.
17. Maryama Shizuo, Nakano
Gakko, Tokyo, 1948, p. 120
18. Subhas Chandra Bose and Japan,
4th section, Asian Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Govt. of Japan,
1956.
19. A Beacon Across Asia: A
Biography of Subhas Chandra Bose. Ed. in-chief: Sisir K. Bose, New
Delhi, Orient Longman, 1973, p. 143.
20. Lebra, Joyce C., op. cit., p.
51.
21. Subhas Chandra Bose and
Japan, op. cit.
23. Ghosh, K.K., The Indian
National Army: Second Front of the Indian Independence Movement,
Meerut, Meenakshi Prakashan, 1969, pp. 127-128.
24. A Beacon Across Asia, op.
cit., p. 167.
25. Ghosh, K.K., op. Cit., p.
135.
26. Press Statement, 19 June
1943.
27. Sopan, op. cit., p. 313.
28. Sivaram, M., The Road to
Delhi, Rutland, Vt., C.E. Tuttle Co., 1967, pp. 122-123.
29. Ibid., pp. 123-124.
30. A Beacon Across Asia, op.
cit., p. 178.
31. Toyle, Hugh, op. cit., p.
go.
32. Ibid., p. 91.
33. A Beacon Across Asia, op.
cit., p. 196.
34. Ibid., p. 200.
35. Toye, Hugh, op. cit., p.
103.
36. A Beacon Across Asia, op.
cit., p. 203.
37. Arun, pseud., Ed., Testament
of Subhas Bose, Delhi, Rajkamal Pub., 1946, p. 170.
38. A Beacon Across Asia, op.
cit., p. 205.
39. Lebra, Joyce C., op. cit., p.
150.
40. British Armed Forces in the
Second World War, Combined Interservices Historical Section,
1958.
41. Lebra, Joyce C., op. cit., p.
158.
42. Ibid., pp. 190-191.
43. Calvocoressi, Peter, and Guy
Wint, The Total War: the Story of World War II, New York, Pantheon
Books, 1972, pp. 801-802.
44. Majumdar, R.C., Three Phases
of India's Struggle for Freedom, Bombay, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1967,
pp. 58-59.
45. Edwardes, Michael, The Last
Years of British India, Cleveland, World Pub. Co.,1964, p. 93.
46. Majumdar, R.C., Jibanera
Smritideepe, Calcutta, General Printers and Publishers, 1978, pp.
229-230, (quotation translated from original Bengali).
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